# MQTT Management Platform — Release 1

Web-based administration for an Eclipse Mosquitto 2.1 broker: management
login/RBAC, MQTT client/group/role management with ACL editing via the
Dynamic Security plugin, and generated + validated broker configuration.

Architecture and scope follow `specification.md` (Release 1, §68.1).

## Stack

```text
mqtt-frontend   React (Vite build) served by nginx, proxies /api → backend
mqtt-backend    FastAPI: management auth, RBAC, dynsec client, config engine
mosquitto       Eclipse Mosquitto 2.1.2 (pinned), dynsec enabled
mosquitto-control  control sidecar: validate/activate/reload configs
mqtt-db         PostgreSQL (management data only; NOT host-exposed)
```

Networks: `frontend-net` (frontend↔backend) and `backend-net`
(backend↔db↔mosquitto↔control). Only the frontend HTTP port is published.

## Quick start

```bash
cp .env.example .env        # then EDIT the change-me values!
docker compose up -d --build
```

Open http://localhost:8080 and sign in with `ADMIN_INITIAL_USERNAME` /
`ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` from your `.env`.

Bootstrap sequence on first start:

1. PostgreSQL starts; backend creates its schema (or run migrations
   explicitly, see below) and seeds the management admin.
2. Mosquitto starts with `mosquitto/bootstrap/mosquitto.conf` on the
   internal network; the dynsec plugin seeds its `admin` client from
   `MOSQUITTO_DYNSEC_PASSWORD`.
3. Backend connects to dynsec as that admin client — the management
   channel is alive.
4. Configuration changes made in the UI are generated from the
   PostgreSQL model, validated with `mosquitto --test-config` (via the
   control sidecar), deployed atomically, and recorded as a revision.

> **Note for Windows users:** the compose healthcheck for mosquitto and
> the control sidecar rely on Unix facilities (`pid: service:`, POSIX
> shell commands); run the stack with Docker Desktop + WSL2 as usual —
> nothing here assumes a Linux host beyond Docker itself.

## Configuration channels (why this design)

* **Dynamic Security (runtime)** — clients/groups/roles/ACLs change via
  the MQTT `$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1` API. No files involved.
* **Generated mosquitto.conf (rare)** — listeners/global settings are
  generated from the DB model and deployed through `mosquitto-control`,
  which OWNS the shared PID namespace (`pid: "service:mosquitto-control"`
  on the broker); it signals the broker process and can restart it — and
  survives broker restarts — without Docker sockets (spec §29).
* Mosquitto 2.1's HTTP API is **not** used as a management channel: it
  has no authentication and (currently) exposes read-only plugin info.

## Development

Backend (in container):

```bash
docker compose exec mqtt-backend pytest -q          # API + generator tests
docker compose exec mqtt-backend ruff check app tests
docker compose exec mqtt-backend alembic upgrade head   # explicit migrations
```

Frontend (local dev server with proxy to backend):

```bash
cd frontend && npm install && npm run dev    # http://localhost:5173
```

## Repository layout

```text
compose.yaml            stack definition (5 services, 2 networks)
.env.example            environment template (secrets: edit before use)
mosquitto/bootstrap/    the one file that ships with the deployment
broker-control/         validate / atomic-activate / reload sidecar
backend/                FastAPI app, models, dynsec client, configgen
frontend/               React + Vite SPA served by nginx
```

## Status & TODO — per release plan (specification.md §68)

Progress against the MVP release plan. Checked items are implemented and
covered by the test suite / running stack.

### Release 1 — Core broker administration (§68.1) — COMPLETE

- [x] Docker Compose stack (5 services, 2 networks, no Docker socket)
- [x] Mosquitto 2.1.2 (pinned) + PostgreSQL
- [x] FastAPI backend + React (Vite) frontend
- [x] Management authentication (HttpOnly session cookies, Argon2id,
      `ADMIN_INITIAL_*` bootstrap, must-change-password flagging; the
      backend exposes the change-password API — UI enforcement of the
      forced change is still pending, see Release 3)
- [x] Management RBAC (super_admin / broker_admin / operator / auditor)
- [x] Dynamic Security integration (backend as the dynsec admin client)
- [x] MQTT clients: create / disable / enable / delete, password reset,
      random passwords (returned exactly once), expected client-ID
      binding (anti-credential-sharing, spec section 11)
- [x] Groups: create / delete, member + role assignment with priorities
- [x] Roles: create / delete, ACL editor (all six ACL types, `%u`/`%c`
      substitution, priorities, draft-then-save)
- [x] Broker configuration editor, basic mode (structured forms +
      read-only preview of the generated `mosquitto.conf`)
- [x] Listener management (port, bind address, protocol, anonymous,
      max-connections; enable/disable, edit, delete)
- [x] Configuration validation (`mosquitto --test-config` via sidecar)
- [x] Configuration generation from the PostgreSQL model

Hardening done beyond the plan:

- [x] Management identity protection: the dynsec `admin` client is hidden
      from Clients and refuses reset/disable/delete (resetting it kicks
      every connection using it — including the backend's own control
      channel)
- [x] Dynsec channel resilience: disconnects are detected immediately and
      the MQTT client is rebuilt instead of failing silently
- [x] Login flow returns to the originally requested page; mid-session
      expiry redirects to login with a return target
- [x] Navigation follows spec §57; unimplemented pages are greyed out
      with the planned release as tooltip

### Release 2 — PKI, versioning, and controlled change (§68.2) — PARTIAL

- [x] Configuration revisions (immutable history; list + detail API and UI)
- [x] Configuration deployment with health check (dynsec roundtrip probe)
- [x] Broker reload (`mosquitto_signal config-reload` via sidecar)
- [x] mosquitto-control service (validate / atomic activate / signal /
      broker health)
- [x] CA creation — internal CA (RSA 3072/4096, ECDSA P-256/P-384),
      private keys encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM)
- [x] Server certificate generation (CN, DNS/IP SANs, serverAuth EKU,
      signed by a platform CA; PEM download)
- [x] Client certificates (CN = MQTT username, clientAuth EKU,
      one-time bundle with cert + key + CA chain as file downloads;
      identity binding to the client metadata)
- [x] mTLS listeners end-to-end: TLS section in the listener form
      (certificate picker, min TLS version, require_certificate,
      use_identity_as_username) — verified live with a client-cert
      publish through an mTLS listener (spec section 24)
- [x] Certificate inventory (serial, fingerprint, SANs, status, expiry)
- [x] TLS config generation: listeners with a bound certificate emit
      certfile/keyfile/cafile; cert files are published to a shared
      certs volume (uid 1883, key mode 0640) before validation/deploy
- [x] Unpublished-port warning: listeners on ports not mapped by
      compose.yaml warn in the preview/deploy (reachable only inside
      the Docker network; keep PUBLISHED_PORTS in sync with compose)
- [x] Restart-required detection + restart from the UI: deploy compares
      listener lines against the previous deployed revision (reload
      cannot apply listener changes, §28) and sets a pending-restart
      flag; a glowing sidebar indicator links to Administration →
      System, where the broker restarts via the control sidecar
      (SIGTERM to PID 1, Docker policy revives it; audited as
      BROKER_RESTARTED, §29/§38)
- [ ] Configuration diff view (revision N-1 → N)
- [ ] Configuration rollback (creates a new revision, §62)
- [ ] CA import (existing external CA)
- [ ] Root-key export + removal workflow (§18)
- [ ] CSR signing (client-side key generation)
- [ ] Certificate revocation + CRL generation/publishing
- [ ] Client-cert disable: revoking access for a connected device
      (needs CRL or dynsec disable + kick; the interim path — disabling
      the client — already refuses reconnects even with a valid cert)

### Release 3 — Operations, safety, and visibility (§68.3) — PARTIAL

- [x] Audit logging (backend records every privileged action: LOGIN,
      LOGOUT, CLIENT_*, GROUP_*, ROLE_*, ACL_CHANGED, LISTENER_*,
      BROKER_CONFIG_DEPLOYED, BROKER_RESTARTED, USER_*, …)
- [x] Client metadata/tags (owner / purpose / tags in PostgreSQL; API
      accepts them on create)
- [x] Administration → System page: broker status + restart (the
      §28 restart gap is closed end-to-end from the UI)
- [x] Broker Status dashboard (§33/§55): $SYS telemetry collected via
      the existing dynsec MQTT connection (extra $SYS/# subscription +
      sys-observe role grant at startup), exposed at
      GET /broker/status and shown on Broker → Status (version,
      uptime, connected/stored clients, subscriptions, retained
      messages, message/publish counters, 1-min load averages, bytes)
- [ ] Audit browsing UI (events are recorded; no viewer page yet)
- [ ] Forced password-change UI (backend flag + API exist; the frontend
      does not enforce `must_change_password` yet)
- [ ] Client metadata editing in the UI
- [ ] ACL simulator (§15)
- [ ] Certificate expiry monitoring
- [ ] Backup and restore (logical, encrypted, §45)
- [ ] Configuration drift detection (§48)
- [ ] Last-known-connection tracking + connected-client view (§34)

### Post-MVP (§68.4 / §69 / §70) — PARTIAL

- [x] Topic explorer (spec §35/§36): live message stream over SSE
      (one MQTT v5 client per browser session, SUBACK-gated subscribe),
      publish with QoS/retain (audited as TOPIC_PUBLISHED — metadata
      only, never the payload), retained-message listing and clearing
      (audited as RETAINED_CLEARED); RBAC: viewing = operator+,
      publishing/clearing = broker-admin+ — verified live end-to-end
- [ ] Topic explorer: consolidated topic view (spec §35.1) — one row
      per known topic; highlight differences between the new and the
      previous message per topic (payload, QoS, retain, MQTT 5
      properties); briefly glow the row on new-message arrival;
      browse the known history of each topic
- [ ] Connection tester + client provisioning wizard
- [ ] Bridge configuration
- [ ] Retained-message administration (partially covered by the topic
      explorer: listing + clearing; a dedicated §36 page can follow)
- [ ] Certificate expiry alerts
- [ ] Prometheus metrics + external notifications
- [ ] Change approval (four-eyes) workflow
- [ ] Topic namespace / JSON-schema registries, and later Phase-3 items