🚧 Add CA and server cert management
This commit is contained in:
+2
-1
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
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"argon2-cffi>=23.1" \
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"paho-mqtt>=2.1" \
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"python-multipart>=0.0.17" \
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"httpx>=0.28"
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"httpx>=0.28" \
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"cryptography>=43.0"
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# Source is plain files; uvicorn imports app.main from WORKDIR (/app).
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COPY . .
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@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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session_secret: str = ""
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session_ttl_seconds: int = 60 * 60 * 8
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# Private-key encryption at rest (spec section 43) — AES-256-GCM
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# master key. Never stored in PostgreSQL.
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secret_encryption_key: str = ""
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# Mosquitto management channel
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mosquitto_host: str = "mosquitto"
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mosquitto_mgmt_port: int = 1883
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+37
-15
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app.models import BrokerSettings, ListenerConfig
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from app.models import BrokerSettings, Certificate, ListenerConfig
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_BOOL = {True: "true", False: "false"}
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@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ def _global_section(db: Session, warnings: list[str]) -> list[str]:
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return lines
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def _listener_block(listener: ListenerConfig, warnings: list[str]) -> list[str]:
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def _listener_block(
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listener: ListenerConfig, db: Session, warnings: list[str]
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) -> list[str]:
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lines: list[str] = []
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if not listener.enabled:
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return lines
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@@ -51,18 +53,38 @@ def _listener_block(listener: ListenerConfig, warnings: list[str]) -> list[str]:
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if listener.max_connections != -1:
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lines.append(f"max_connections {listener.max_connections}")
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if listener.tls_enabled:
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# TLS blocks only become valid once PKI ships (Release 2); we
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# generate them now so the model is forward-compatible, but warn.
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warnings.append(
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f"listener '{listener.name}': TLS requested but PKI is not "
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"available in Release 1; certfile/keyfile not set"
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)
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if listener.tls_min_version:
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lines.append(f"tls_version {listener.tls_min_version}")
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if listener.require_certificate:
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lines.append("require_certificate true")
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if listener.use_identity_as_username:
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lines.append("use_identity_as_username true")
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# Real PKI material (spec section 30): when a certificate is bound,
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# the deploy pipeline publishes cert/key/CA files under
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# /mosquitto/certs/<id>.crt|key BEFORE the config referencing
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# them is activated, so validation sees real files.
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cert = db.get(Certificate, listener.cert_id) if listener.cert_id else None
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ca = db.get(Certificate, cert.parent_id) if cert and cert.parent_id else None
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if cert is not None:
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cert_dir = "/mosquitto/certs"
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lines.append(f"certfile {cert_dir}/{cert.id}.crt")
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lines.append(f"keyfile {cert_dir}/{cert.id}.key")
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if ca is not None:
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lines.append(f"cafile {cert_dir}/{ca.id}.crt")
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if listener.tls_min_version:
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lines.append(f"tls_version {listener.tls_min_version}")
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if listener.require_certificate:
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lines.append("require_certificate true")
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if listener.use_identity_as_username:
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lines.append("use_identity_as_username true")
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else:
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# TLS requested but no certificate bound: forward-compatible
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# block without certfile/keyfile, with an actionable warning.
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warnings.append(
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f"listener '{listener.name}': TLS requested but no certificate "
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"is bound; certfile/keyfile not set. Issue a server certificate "
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"and bind it to this listener."
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)
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if listener.tls_min_version:
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lines.append(f"tls_version {listener.tls_min_version}")
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if listener.require_certificate:
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lines.append("require_certificate true")
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if listener.use_identity_as_username:
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lines.append("use_identity_as_username true")
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return lines
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@@ -101,7 +123,7 @@ def generate_config(db: Session) -> GenerationResult:
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if enabled:
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lines.append("# --- Listeners ---")
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for listener in enabled:
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block = _listener_block(listener, warnings)
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block = _listener_block(listener, db, warnings)
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if block:
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lines.append(f"# listener: {listener.name}")
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lines.extend(block)
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@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
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"""Key encryption at rest (spec sections 43-44).
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Private keys that the platform must keep (CA and server keys) are stored
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in PostgreSQL ONLY in encrypted form, using AES-256-GCM authenticated
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encryption. The master key comes from the SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY
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environment variable (Docker secret in production) and never touches
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the database.
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Wire format: "v1:<nonce-hex>:<ciphertext-hex>" — the version prefix
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keeps the format evolvable without breaking existing rows.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
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from app.config import get_settings
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_FORMAT = "v1"
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def _master_key() -> bytes:
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"""Derive the 32-byte AES key from the configured secret.
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The secret is hashed to exactly 32 bytes (AES-256) regardless of the
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length the operator chose for SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
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"""
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import hashlib
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secret = get_settings().secret_encryption_key.encode("utf-8")
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return hashlib.sha256(secret).digest()
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def encrypt_secret(plaintext: str) -> str:
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"""Encrypt a PEM string into the storage format."""
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nonce = os.urandom(12) # 96-bit nonce, GCM standard
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aesgcm = AESGCM(_master_key())
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ciphertext = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.encode("utf-8"), None)
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return f"{_FORMAT}:{nonce.hex()}:{ciphertext.hex()}"
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def decrypt_secret(blob: str) -> str:
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"""Decrypt a stored secret back to plaintext PEM."""
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try:
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version, nonce_hex, ciphertext_hex = blob.split(":", 2)
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise ValueError("corrupt secret blob: bad format") from exc
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if version != _FORMAT:
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raise ValueError(f"unsupported secret blob version: {version}")
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aesgcm = AESGCM(_master_key())
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try:
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plaintext = aesgcm.decrypt(
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bytes.fromhex(nonce_hex), bytes.fromhex(ciphertext_hex), None
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)
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except Exception as exc:
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raise ValueError("secret decryption failed (wrong master key?)") from exc
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return plaintext.decode("utf-8")
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+3
-2
@@ -125,9 +125,10 @@ def health_ready():
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# Routers
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from app.routers import auth, broker, mqtt, users # noqa: E402
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from app.routers import auth, broker, mqtt, pki, users # noqa: E402
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app.include_router(auth.router)
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app.include_router(users.router)
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app.include_router(mqtt.router)
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app.include_router(broker.router)
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app.include_router(broker.router)
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app.include_router(pki.router)
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+22
-1
@@ -150,15 +150,36 @@ class ConfigRevision(Base):
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class Certificate(Base):
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"""A CA or leaf certificate in the platform PKI store (spec 16-21).
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Hierarchy: a CA row has is_ca=True and parent_id=None (internal
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self-signed root/intermediate, Release 2 MVP keeps exactly one level).
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A leaf row points at the CA that signed it. Private keys are stored
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ENCRYPTED (AES-256-GCM, see app/crypto.py) — never in plaintext.
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"""
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__tablename__ = "certificates"
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id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
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common_name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(200))
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certificate_pem: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
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# Encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM) once keys are managed (Release 2).
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# Encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM via app/crypto.py), spec section 43.
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private_key_pem: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
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expiry_date: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
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created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow)
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# --- Release 2 additions ---
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is_ca: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=False)
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# CA that signed this certificate (None for self-signed CAs).
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parent_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(
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ForeignKey("certificates.id", ondelete="SET NULL")
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)
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key_algorithm: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), default="ecdsa-p256")
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serial_number: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64), unique=True, index=True)
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dns_sans: Mapped[list] = mapped_column(JSON, default=list)
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ip_sans: Mapped[list] = mapped_column(JSON, default=list)
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fingerprint: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(200), index=True)
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# issued|expired|revoked — derived/stored at issue time and on expiry checks
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status: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), default="issued")
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
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"""PKI operations: internal CA + server certificate issuance (spec 16-19).
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All private-key and signing operations happen here, in the backend —
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the frontend only triggers them (spec section 16). Keys are returned in
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PEM form to the storage layer, which encrypts them at rest (spec 43).
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Release 2 MVP scope:
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* create an internal CA (RSA 3072/4096, ECDSA P-256/P-384)
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* issue a server certificate from that CA (CN + DNS/IP SANs, serverAuth)
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CSR signing, client certificates, revocation/CRL arrive later.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import datetime
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import uuid
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from cryptography import x509
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, ed448, ed25519, rsa
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from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
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# Key algorithms supported for both CAs and leaf certificates (spec 17).
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KEY_ALGORITHMS = ("rsa3072", "rsa4096", "ecdsa-p256", "ecdsa-p384")
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class PkiError(ValueError):
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"""Invalid PKI request (bad algorithm, empty subject, ...)."""
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def _generate_key(algorithm: str):
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"""Generate a private key for the given algorithm identifier."""
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if algorithm == "rsa3072":
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return rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=3072)
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if algorithm == "rsa4096":
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return rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=4096)
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if algorithm == "ecdsa-p256":
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return ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
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if algorithm == "ecdsa-p384":
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return ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP384R1())
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raise PkiError(
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f"unsupported key algorithm {algorithm!r}; expected one of {KEY_ALGORITHMS}"
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)
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def _name(common_name: str, organization: str | None, unit: str | None,
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country: str | None) -> x509.Name:
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attrs = [x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)]
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if organization:
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attrs.append(x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.ORGANIZATION_NAME, organization))
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if unit:
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attrs.append(x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT_NAME, unit))
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if country:
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attrs.append(x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COUNTRY_NAME, country))
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return x509.Name(attrs)
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def _pem_key(key) -> str:
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return key.private_bytes(
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encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
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format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
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encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
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).decode("utf-8")
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def _pem_cert(cert: x509.Certificate) -> str:
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return cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM).decode("utf-8")
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def _serial() -> int:
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# Positive, 159-bit (20-byte) random serial per RFC 5280 conventions.
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return int.from_bytes(uuid.uuid4().bytes[:20], "big") >> 1
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def _not_after(now: datetime.datetime, validity_days: int) -> datetime.datetime:
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if validity_days <= 0:
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raise PkiError("validity must be a positive number of days")
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return now + datetime.timedelta(days=validity_days)
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@dataclass
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class IssuedPair:
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"""A certificate + its private key, both as PEM text."""
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certificate_pem: str
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private_key_pem: str
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serial_number: int
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not_valid_after: datetime.datetime
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def create_ca(
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*,
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common_name: str,
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validity_days: int,
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key_algorithm: str,
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organization: str | None = None,
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organizational_unit: str | None = None,
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country: str | None = None,
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) -> IssuedPair:
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"""Create a self-signed CA certificate (spec section 17)."""
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if not common_name.strip():
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raise PkiError("common name must not be empty")
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now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC)
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key = _generate_key(key_algorithm)
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subject = issuer = _name(common_name, organization, organizational_unit, country)
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cert = (
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x509.CertificateBuilder()
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.subject_name(subject)
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.issuer_name(issuer)
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.public_key(key.public_key())
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.serial_number(_serial())
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.not_valid_before(now - datetime.timedelta(minutes=5)) # clock skew
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.not_valid_after(_not_after(now, validity_days))
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.add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), critical=True)
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.add_extension(x509.KeyUsage(
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digital_signature=True,
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content_commitment=False,
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key_encipherment=False,
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data_encipherment=False,
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key_agreement=False,
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key_cert_sign=True,
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crl_sign=True,
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encipher_only=False,
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decipher_only=False,
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), critical=True)
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.sign(key, hashes.SHA256())
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)
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return IssuedPair(
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certificate_pem=_pem_cert(cert),
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private_key_pem=_pem_key(key),
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serial_number=cert.serial_number,
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not_valid_after=cert.not_valid_after_utc,
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)
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def issue_server_certificate(
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*,
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ca_certificate_pem: str,
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ca_private_key_pem: str,
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common_name: str,
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validity_days: int,
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dns_sans: list[str] | None = None,
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ip_sans: list[str] | None = None,
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organization: str | None = None,
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organizational_unit: str | None = None,
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country: str | None = None,
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) -> IssuedPair:
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"""Issue a server certificate signed by the given CA (spec section 19).
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The certificate carries the serverAuth extended key usage and the
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CN plus any DNS/IP SANs — exactly what a Mosquitto TLS listener needs.
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"""
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if not common_name.strip():
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raise PkiError("common name must not be empty")
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dns_sans = [s.strip() for s in (dns_sans or []) if s.strip()]
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ip_sans = [s.strip() for s in (ip_sans or []) if s.strip()]
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ca_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(ca_certificate_pem.encode("utf-8"))
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ca_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
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ca_private_key_pem.encode("utf-8"), password=None
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)
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# Type narrowing for the checker: certificate signing requires an
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# RSA/EC/Ed25519/Ed448 key — DH/DSA keys load but cannot sign certs.
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if not isinstance(
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ca_key,
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(
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rsa.RSAPrivateKey,
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ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey,
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ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey,
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ed448.Ed448PrivateKey,
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),
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):
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raise PkiError("the CA private key type cannot sign certificates")
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# The leaf key is always ECDSA P-256 for Release 2: fast to generate,
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# modern, and universally supported by MQTT clients.
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key = _generate_key("ecdsa-p256")
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now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC)
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subject = _name(common_name, organization, organizational_unit, country)
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san_entries: list[x509.GeneralName] = [x509.DNSName(common_name)]
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for name in dns_sans:
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san_entries.append(x509.DNSName(name))
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for ip in ip_sans:
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try:
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import ipaddress
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san_entries.append(x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address(ip)))
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise PkiError(f"invalid IP SAN {ip!r}") from exc
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cert = (
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x509.CertificateBuilder()
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.subject_name(subject)
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.issuer_name(ca_cert.subject)
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.public_key(key.public_key())
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.serial_number(_serial())
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.not_valid_before(now - datetime.timedelta(minutes=5))
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.not_valid_after(_not_after(now, validity_days))
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.add_extension(
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x509.SubjectAlternativeName(san_entries), critical=False
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)
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.add_extension(
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x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([x509.oid.ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]),
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critical=False,
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)
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.add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), critical=True)
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.sign(ca_key, hashes.SHA256())
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)
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return IssuedPair(
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certificate_pem=_pem_cert(cert),
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private_key_pem=_pem_key(key),
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serial_number=cert.serial_number,
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not_valid_after=cert.not_valid_after_utc,
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)
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def fingerprint(certificate_pem: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""SHA-256 fingerprint of a certificate, colon-separated hex."""
|
||||
cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(certificate_pem.encode("utf-8"))
|
||||
digest = cert.fingerprint(hashes.SHA256())
|
||||
return ":".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in digest)
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ an immutable revision (spec section 26).
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from datetime import UTC, datetime
|
||||
from typing import Annotated
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ from app.db import get_db
|
||||
from app.deps import CurrentUser, require_roles
|
||||
from app.models import (
|
||||
BrokerSettings,
|
||||
Certificate,
|
||||
ConfigRevision,
|
||||
ListenerConfig,
|
||||
ManagementRole,
|
||||
@@ -207,6 +209,51 @@ def upsert_setting(
|
||||
# --- Generation, validation, deployment ----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# The sidecar and broker share the mosquitto_certs volume; the backend
|
||||
# publishes the DECRYPTED material there because Mosquitto needs
|
||||
# plaintext files (uid 1883, mode 600). The DB keeps the encrypted master.
|
||||
CERTS_DIR = os.environ.get("MOSQUITTO_CERTS_DIR", "/mosquitto/certs")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _publish_certificates(db: Session) -> None:
|
||||
"""Write cert/key/CA files for every TLS listener's bound certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
Must run BEFORE the config referencing them is validated/activated,
|
||||
otherwise `mosquitto --test-config` fails on missing files.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
listeners = db.scalars(
|
||||
select(ListenerConfig).where(ListenerConfig.tls_enabled.is_(True))
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
seen: set[uuid.UUID] = set()
|
||||
for listener in listeners:
|
||||
if listener.cert_id is None or listener.cert_id in seen:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
seen.add(listener.cert_id)
|
||||
cert = db.get(Certificate, listener.cert_id)
|
||||
if cert is None or cert.private_key_pem is None:
|
||||
continue # nothing to publish (warned about in configgen)
|
||||
os.makedirs(CERTS_DIR, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
cert_path = os.path.join(CERTS_DIR, f"{cert.id}.crt")
|
||||
with open(cert_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
f.write(cert.certificate_pem)
|
||||
os.chmod(cert_path, 0o644)
|
||||
# Private key: decrypted for the broker (DB keeps the AES-GCM copy)
|
||||
from app.crypto import decrypt_secret
|
||||
|
||||
key_path = os.path.join(CERTS_DIR, f"{cert.id}.key")
|
||||
with open(key_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
f.write(decrypt_secret(cert.private_key_pem))
|
||||
os.chmod(key_path, 0o600)
|
||||
# Issuing CA certificate (for cafile)
|
||||
if cert.parent_id is not None:
|
||||
ca = db.get(Certificate, cert.parent_id)
|
||||
if ca is not None:
|
||||
ca_path = os.path.join(CERTS_DIR, f"{ca.id}.crt")
|
||||
with open(ca_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
f.write(ca.certificate_pem)
|
||||
os.chmod(ca_path, 0o644)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/config/preview", response_model=ConfigPreviewOut)
|
||||
def preview_config(
|
||||
db: Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)], _user: AnyReader
|
||||
@@ -235,7 +282,8 @@ def deploy_config(
|
||||
db: Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)],
|
||||
user: BrokerAdmin,
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Generate -> validate -> activate + reload -> record revision."""
|
||||
"""Generate -> publish certs -> validate -> activate + reload -> revision."""
|
||||
_publish_certificates(db)
|
||||
result = generate_config(db)
|
||||
response = _call_control("/deploy", json_body={"content": result.config_text})
|
||||
if response.get("status") != "deployed":
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
|
||||
"""PKI management: internal CA + server certificates (spec sections 16-19).
|
||||
|
||||
All endpoints require the PKI_ADMIN role (or super_admin). Private keys
|
||||
never appear in any response — the PEM download endpoints expose only
|
||||
the public certificate material.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from typing import Annotated
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import PlainTextResponse
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
|
||||
|
||||
from app import audit
|
||||
from app.crypto import encrypt_secret
|
||||
from app.db import get_db
|
||||
from app.deps import require_roles
|
||||
from app.models import Certificate, ManagementRole
|
||||
from app.pki import (
|
||||
PkiError,
|
||||
create_ca as pki_create_ca,
|
||||
fingerprint as pki_fingerprint,
|
||||
issue_server_certificate,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from app.schemas import CaCreate, CertificateOut, ServerCertCreate
|
||||
|
||||
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/pki", tags=["pki"])
|
||||
|
||||
PkiAdmin = Annotated[
|
||||
object, Depends(require_roles(ManagementRole.PKI_ADMIN))
|
||||
]
|
||||
DbDep = Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_certificate(db: Session, cert_id: uuid.UUID) -> Certificate:
|
||||
cert = db.get(Certificate, cert_id)
|
||||
if cert is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, "certificate not found")
|
||||
return cert
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/ca", response_model=list[CertificateOut])
|
||||
def list_cas(db: DbDep, _user: PkiAdmin):
|
||||
"""All certificate authorities in the store."""
|
||||
return db.scalars(
|
||||
select(Certificate).where(Certificate.is_ca.is_(True))
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/ca", response_model=CertificateOut, status_code=201)
|
||||
def create_ca(body: CaCreate, request: Request, db: DbDep, _user: PkiAdmin):
|
||||
"""Create a self-signed internal CA (spec section 17)."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
issued = pki_create_ca(
|
||||
common_name=body.common_name,
|
||||
validity_days=body.validity_days,
|
||||
key_algorithm=body.key_algorithm,
|
||||
organization=body.organization,
|
||||
organizational_unit=body.organizational_unit,
|
||||
country=body.country,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except PkiError as exc:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, str(exc)) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
ca = Certificate(
|
||||
common_name=body.common_name,
|
||||
certificate_pem=issued.certificate_pem,
|
||||
private_key_pem=encrypt_secret(issued.private_key_pem),
|
||||
expiry_date=issued.not_valid_after,
|
||||
is_ca=True,
|
||||
key_algorithm=body.key_algorithm,
|
||||
serial_number=str(issued.serial_number),
|
||||
dns_sans=[],
|
||||
ip_sans=[],
|
||||
fingerprint=pki_fingerprint(issued.certificate_pem),
|
||||
status="issued",
|
||||
)
|
||||
db.add(ca)
|
||||
db.flush()
|
||||
audit.record(
|
||||
db,
|
||||
"CA_CREATED",
|
||||
request=request,
|
||||
object_type="certificate_authority",
|
||||
object_id=str(ca.id),
|
||||
new_value={"common_name": body.common_name},
|
||||
)
|
||||
return ca
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/certificates", response_model=list[CertificateOut])
|
||||
def list_certificates(db: DbDep, _user: PkiAdmin):
|
||||
"""Full certificate inventory (spec section 21), newest first."""
|
||||
return db.scalars(
|
||||
select(Certificate).order_by(Certificate.created_at.desc())
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/certificates", response_model=CertificateOut, status_code=201)
|
||||
def issue_certificate(
|
||||
body: ServerCertCreate, request: Request, db: DbDep, _user: PkiAdmin
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Issue a server certificate signed by the given CA (spec section 19)."""
|
||||
from app.crypto import decrypt_secret
|
||||
|
||||
ca = _get_certificate(db, body.ca_id)
|
||||
if not ca.is_ca:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, "the referenced certificate is not a CA"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ca.private_key_pem is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
|
||||
"the CA private key is not held by the platform (offline CA); "
|
||||
"it cannot issue certificates",
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ca_key_pem = decrypt_secret(ca.private_key_pem)
|
||||
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
|
||||
f"could not decrypt the CA key: {exc}",
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
issued = issue_server_certificate(
|
||||
ca_certificate_pem=ca.certificate_pem,
|
||||
ca_private_key_pem=ca_key_pem,
|
||||
common_name=body.common_name,
|
||||
validity_days=body.validity_days,
|
||||
dns_sans=body.dns_sans,
|
||||
ip_sans=body.ip_sans,
|
||||
organization=body.organization,
|
||||
organizational_unit=body.organizational_unit,
|
||||
country=body.country,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except PkiError as exc:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, str(exc)) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
cert = Certificate(
|
||||
common_name=body.common_name,
|
||||
certificate_pem=issued.certificate_pem,
|
||||
private_key_pem=encrypt_secret(issued.private_key_pem),
|
||||
expiry_date=issued.not_valid_after,
|
||||
is_ca=False,
|
||||
parent_id=ca.id,
|
||||
key_algorithm="ecdsa-p256",
|
||||
serial_number=str(issued.serial_number),
|
||||
dns_sans=body.dns_sans,
|
||||
ip_sans=body.ip_sans,
|
||||
fingerprint=pki_fingerprint(issued.certificate_pem),
|
||||
status="issued",
|
||||
)
|
||||
db.add(cert)
|
||||
db.flush()
|
||||
audit.record(
|
||||
db,
|
||||
"CERTIFICATE_ISSUED",
|
||||
request=request,
|
||||
object_type="certificate",
|
||||
object_id=str(cert.id),
|
||||
new_value={
|
||||
"common_name": body.common_name,
|
||||
"ca": ca.common_name,
|
||||
"dns_sans": body.dns_sans,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
return cert
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get(
|
||||
"/certificates/{cert_id}/download",
|
||||
response_class=PlainTextResponse,
|
||||
)
|
||||
def download_certificate(cert_id: uuid.UUID, db: DbDep, _user: PkiAdmin):
|
||||
"""Download the certificate (public part only) as PEM."""
|
||||
cert = _get_certificate(db, cert_id)
|
||||
return PlainTextResponse(
|
||||
cert.certificate_pem,
|
||||
media_type="application/x-pem-file",
|
||||
headers={
|
||||
"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{cert.common_name}.crt"'
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.delete(
|
||||
"/certificates/{cert_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT
|
||||
)
|
||||
def delete_certificate(
|
||||
cert_id: uuid.UUID, request: Request, db: DbDep, _user: PkiAdmin
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Remove a certificate from the store.
|
||||
|
||||
CAs with still-issued children are refused, and a certificate that a
|
||||
listener is bound to cannot be deleted (the generated config would
|
||||
reference a missing file).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
cert = _get_certificate(db, cert_id)
|
||||
if cert.is_ca:
|
||||
children = db.scalar(
|
||||
select(Certificate.id).where(Certificate.parent_id == cert.id)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if children is not None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
|
||||
"the CA still has issued certificates; delete them first",
|
||||
)
|
||||
from app.models import ListenerConfig
|
||||
|
||||
bound = db.scalar(
|
||||
select(ListenerConfig.id).where(ListenerConfig.cert_id == cert.id)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if bound is not None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
|
||||
"the certificate is bound to a listener; unbind it first",
|
||||
)
|
||||
db.delete(cert)
|
||||
audit.record(
|
||||
db,
|
||||
"CERTIFICATE_DELETED",
|
||||
request=request,
|
||||
object_type="certificate",
|
||||
object_id=str(cert_id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return None
|
||||
+45
-1
@@ -234,4 +234,48 @@ class RevisionOut(BaseModel):
|
||||
|
||||
class RevisionDetailOut(RevisionOut):
|
||||
config_text: str
|
||||
validation_result: dict[str, Any]
|
||||
validation_result: dict[str, Any]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- PKI: certificate authorities + server certificates (spec 16-19) ---------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class CaCreate(BaseModel):
|
||||
common_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=200)
|
||||
validity_days: int = Field(gt=0, le=36500)
|
||||
key_algorithm: Literal["rsa3072", "rsa4096", "ecdsa-p256", "ecdsa-p384"]
|
||||
organization: str | None = None
|
||||
organizational_unit: str | None = None
|
||||
country: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=2)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ServerCertCreate(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Issue a server certificate signed by an existing CA (spec 19)."""
|
||||
|
||||
ca_id: uuid.UUID
|
||||
common_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=200)
|
||||
validity_days: int = Field(gt=0, le=36500)
|
||||
dns_sans: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
ip_sans: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
organization: str | None = None
|
||||
organizational_unit: str | None = None
|
||||
country: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=2)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class CertificateOut(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Inventory view — NEVER includes the private key (spec section 21)."""
|
||||
|
||||
id: uuid.UUID
|
||||
common_name: str
|
||||
is_ca: bool
|
||||
parent_id: uuid.UUID | None
|
||||
key_algorithm: str
|
||||
serial_number: str
|
||||
dns_sans: list[str]
|
||||
ip_sans: list[str]
|
||||
fingerprint: str
|
||||
status: str
|
||||
expiry_date: datetime
|
||||
created_at: datetime
|
||||
|
||||
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@ from app import models # noqa: F401 (register all models with Base)
|
||||
config = context.config
|
||||
|
||||
if config.config_file_name is not None:
|
||||
fileConfig(config.config_file_name)
|
||||
# Our minimal alembic.ini intentionally has no [loggers]/[handlers]/
|
||||
# [formatters] sections; fileConfig raises KeyError without them.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
fileConfig(config.config_file_name)
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - logging config is optional here
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
url = get_settings().database_url
|
||||
if url.startswith("postgresql://"):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
"""Release 2: expand certificates table for CA/server-certificate PKI.
|
||||
|
||||
Revision ID: r2_0002
|
||||
Revises: r1_0001
|
||||
Create Date: 2026-09-19
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from typing import Sequence, Union
|
||||
|
||||
import sqlalchemy as sa
|
||||
from alembic import op
|
||||
|
||||
revision: str = "r2_0002"
|
||||
down_revision: Union[str, None] = "r1_0001"
|
||||
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str] | None] = None
|
||||
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str] | None] = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def upgrade() -> None:
|
||||
# The certificates table exists since r1_0001 (forward-compatible
|
||||
# placeholder). Release 2 adds CA semantics, hierarchy, SANs,
|
||||
# serial/fingerprint identity, and a lifecycle status.
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("is_ca", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default=sa.false()))
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("parent_id", sa.Uuid(), nullable=True))
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("key_algorithm", sa.String(20), nullable=False, server_default="ecdsa-p256"))
|
||||
# Serial numbers are unique per RFC 5280; existing rows have none, so
|
||||
# the column is added nullable first, then made NOT NULL below (the
|
||||
# table has never been written to, so no backfill is needed).
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("serial_number", sa.String(64), nullable=True))
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("dns_sans", sa.JSON(), nullable=False, server_default="[]"))
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("ip_sans", sa.JSON(), nullable=False, server_default="[]"))
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("fingerprint", sa.String(200), nullable=True))
|
||||
op.add_column("certificates", sa.Column("status", sa.String(20), nullable=False, server_default="issued"))
|
||||
op.create_foreign_key(
|
||||
"fk_certificates_parent",
|
||||
"certificates",
|
||||
"certificates",
|
||||
["parent_id"],
|
||||
["id"],
|
||||
ondelete="SET NULL",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# No rows exist yet in practice (table was never written to), so the
|
||||
# unique index is safe; if a legacy row existed without a serial it
|
||||
# must be removed manually first.
|
||||
op.create_index("ix_certificates_serial_number", "certificates", ["serial_number"], unique=True)
|
||||
op.create_index("ix_certificates_fingerprint", "certificates", ["fingerprint"])
|
||||
op.alter_column("certificates", "serial_number", nullable=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def downgrade() -> None:
|
||||
op.alter_column("certificates", "serial_number", nullable=True)
|
||||
op.drop_index("ix_certificates_fingerprint", table_name="certificates")
|
||||
op.drop_index("ix_certificates_serial_number", table_name="certificates")
|
||||
op.drop_constraint("fk_certificates_parent", "certificates", type_="foreignkey")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "status")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "fingerprint")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "ip_sans")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "dns_sans")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "serial_number")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "key_algorithm")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "parent_id")
|
||||
op.drop_column("certificates", "is_ca")
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ dependencies = [
|
||||
"paho-mqtt>=2.1",
|
||||
"python-multipart>=0.0.17",
|
||||
"httpx>=0.28",
|
||||
"cryptography>=43.0",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[project.optional-dependencies]
|
||||
|
||||
+103
-1
@@ -277,4 +277,106 @@ def test_audit_events_recorded(admin_client, db_session):
|
||||
|
||||
admin_client.post("/api/v1/mqtt/clients", json={"username": "audited-1"})
|
||||
actions = db_session.scalars(select(AuditEvent.action)).all()
|
||||
assert "CLIENT_CREATED" in actions
|
||||
assert "CLIENT_CREATED" in actions
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- PKI: CA + server certificates (spec sections 16-19) -----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ca_creation_and_inventory(admin_client):
|
||||
response = admin_client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/pki/ca",
|
||||
json={
|
||||
"common_name": "MQTT Platform Root CA",
|
||||
"validity_days": 3650,
|
||||
"key_algorithm": "ecdsa-p256",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 201, response.text
|
||||
ca = response.json()
|
||||
assert ca["is_ca"] is True
|
||||
assert ca["status"] == "issued"
|
||||
assert len(ca["serial_number"]) > 10
|
||||
assert ca["fingerprint"].count(":") == 31 # sha-256 hex pairs
|
||||
# No private key material ever appears in a response.
|
||||
assert "private_key_pem" not in ca
|
||||
assert "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY" not in response.text
|
||||
|
||||
cas = admin_client.get("/api/v1/pki/ca").json()
|
||||
assert any(c["common_name"] == "MQTT Platform Root CA" for c in cas)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_server_certificate_issuance(admin_client):
|
||||
ca_id = admin_client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/pki/ca",
|
||||
json={
|
||||
"common_name": "Test CA",
|
||||
"validity_days": 3650,
|
||||
"key_algorithm": "ecdsa-p256",
|
||||
},
|
||||
).json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
response = admin_client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/pki/certificates",
|
||||
json={
|
||||
"ca_id": ca_id,
|
||||
"common_name": "mqtt.example.local",
|
||||
"validity_days": 365,
|
||||
"dns_sans": ["mqtt", "mqtt.local"],
|
||||
"ip_sans": ["10.20.30.40"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 201, response.text
|
||||
cert = response.json()
|
||||
assert cert["is_ca"] is False
|
||||
assert cert["parent_id"] == ca_id
|
||||
assert cert["dns_sans"] == ["mqtt", "mqtt.local"]
|
||||
assert cert["ip_sans"] == ["10.20.30.40"]
|
||||
assert "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY" not in response.text
|
||||
|
||||
# The download endpoint returns the public PEM.
|
||||
download = admin_client.get(f"/api/v1/pki/certificates/{cert['id']}/download")
|
||||
assert download.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" in download.text
|
||||
assert "PRIVATE KEY" not in download.text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_server_certificate_is_cryptographically_valid(admin_client):
|
||||
"""The issued chain must verify against the issuing CA (real crypto)."""
|
||||
from cryptography import x509
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
|
||||
|
||||
ca_id = admin_client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/pki/ca",
|
||||
json={
|
||||
"common_name": "Verify CA",
|
||||
"validity_days": 3650,
|
||||
"key_algorithm": "ecdsa-p256",
|
||||
},
|
||||
).json()["id"]
|
||||
cert_id = admin_client.post(
|
||||
"/api/v1/pki/certificates",
|
||||
json={"ca_id": ca_id, "common_name": "broker.local", "validity_days": 30},
|
||||
).json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
ca_pem = admin_client.get(f"/api/v1/pki/certificates/{ca_id}/download").text
|
||||
cert_pem = admin_client.get(f"/api/v1/pki/certificates/{cert_id}/download").text
|
||||
ca_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(ca_pem.encode())
|
||||
cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_pem.encode())
|
||||
|
||||
# Signature verification: the leaf must validate against the CA key.
|
||||
ca_cert.public_key().verify(
|
||||
cert.signature,
|
||||
cert.tbs_certificate_bytes,
|
||||
ec.ECDSA(cert.signature_hash_algorithm),
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Serial and fingerprint match the inventory fields.
|
||||
inv = next(
|
||||
c
|
||||
for c in admin_client.get("/api/v1/pki/certificates").json()
|
||||
if c["id"] == cert_id
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert int(inv["serial_number"]) == cert.serial_number
|
||||
from app.pki import fingerprint as pki_fingerprint
|
||||
|
||||
assert inv["fingerprint"] == pki_fingerprint(cert_pem)
|
||||
@@ -77,5 +77,76 @@ def test_tls_listener_without_pki_warns(session):
|
||||
session.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
result = generate_config(session)
|
||||
assert any("PKI is not available" in w for w in result.warnings)
|
||||
assert "tls_version tlsv1.2" in result.config_text
|
||||
assert any("no certificate is bound" in w for w in result.warnings)
|
||||
assert "tls_version tlsv1.2" in result.config_text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_tls_listener_with_bound_certificate_emits_certfile(session):
|
||||
"""With PKI material bound, the generator emits real cert paths (spec 30)."""
|
||||
from datetime import UTC, datetime
|
||||
|
||||
from app.crypto import encrypt_secret
|
||||
from app.models import Certificate
|
||||
from app.pki import create_ca, issue_server_certificate
|
||||
|
||||
ca_issued = create_ca(
|
||||
common_name="Test CA", validity_days=3650, key_algorithm="ecdsa-p256"
|
||||
)
|
||||
ca = Certificate(
|
||||
common_name="Test CA",
|
||||
certificate_pem=ca_issued.certificate_pem,
|
||||
private_key_pem=encrypt_secret(ca_issued.private_key_pem),
|
||||
expiry_date=ca_issued.not_valid_after,
|
||||
is_ca=True,
|
||||
key_algorithm="ecdsa-p256",
|
||||
serial_number=str(ca_issued.serial_number),
|
||||
dns_sans=[],
|
||||
ip_sans=[],
|
||||
fingerprint="aa:bb",
|
||||
status="issued",
|
||||
)
|
||||
session.add(ca)
|
||||
session.flush()
|
||||
|
||||
leaf = issue_server_certificate(
|
||||
ca_certificate_pem=ca_issued.certificate_pem,
|
||||
ca_private_key_pem=ca_issued.private_key_pem,
|
||||
common_name="broker.local",
|
||||
validity_days=365,
|
||||
)
|
||||
cert = Certificate(
|
||||
common_name="broker.local",
|
||||
certificate_pem=leaf.certificate_pem,
|
||||
private_key_pem=encrypt_secret(leaf.private_key_pem),
|
||||
expiry_date=leaf.not_valid_after,
|
||||
is_ca=False,
|
||||
parent_id=ca.id,
|
||||
key_algorithm="ecdsa-p256",
|
||||
serial_number=str(leaf.serial_number),
|
||||
dns_sans=["broker.local"],
|
||||
ip_sans=[],
|
||||
fingerprint="cc:dd",
|
||||
status="issued",
|
||||
)
|
||||
session.add(cert)
|
||||
session.flush()
|
||||
|
||||
session.add(
|
||||
ListenerConfig(
|
||||
name="tls-prod",
|
||||
port=8883,
|
||||
protocol="mqtt",
|
||||
tls_enabled=True,
|
||||
tls_min_version="tlsv1.2",
|
||||
cert_id=cert.id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
session.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
result = generate_config(session)
|
||||
text = result.config_text
|
||||
assert f"certfile /mosquitto/certs/{cert.id}.crt" in text
|
||||
assert f"keyfile /mosquitto/certs/{cert.id}.key" in text
|
||||
assert f"cafile /mosquitto/certs/{ca.id}.crt" in text
|
||||
assert "tls_version tlsv1.2" in text
|
||||
assert result.warnings == []
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user